Strengthening the global trade architecture for development by Hoekman, Bernard
POLICY  RESEARCH  WORKING  PAPER  2757
Strengthening  the Global  TheWorldTrade
Organization  (WTOj  has a
Trade Architecture  for  role to play in strengthening
the global trading system  for Development  development,  primarily by
lowering barriers to trade  in
Bernard Hoekman  goods and services and
ensuring that trade rules are
useful to developing




in particular,  concerted action
outside the WTO  to enhance
the trade capacity of poor




















































































































d|  POLICY  RESEARCH  WORKING  PAPER  2757
Summary findings
Despite recurring  rounds of trade liberalization  under the  The most important contribution the WTO can  make
auspices of the World Trade  Organization  (and its  to development  is to improve market  access conditions-
predecessor,  the General Agreement  on Tariffs and  for goods and services-and ensure that trade rules are
Trade,  or GATT),  complemented  by unilateral reforms,  useful  to developing countries. Enhancing  trade capacity
many developing countries have not been able to  requires concerted  action outside the WTO ("aid  for
integrate  into the world economy.  Hoekman argues that  trade") as well as unilateral actions by both industrial and
from the perspective of the poorest countries,  a  developing countries to reduce antitrade  biases.
multipronged  strategy  is required to strengthen  the
global  trading system.  Moreover,  much of the agenda
must be addressed outside the WTO.
This paper-a product of Trade, Development Research Group-is part of a larger effort in the group to investigate how
the WTO can be used more effectively by developing countries to integrate into the world economy. Copies of the paper
are available free from the World Bank, 1818 H Street NW, Washington, DC 20433. Please contact Paulina Flewitt, room
MC3-333, telephone 202-473-2724, fax 202-522-1159,  email addresspflewitt@worldbank.org.  Policy Research Working
Papers are also postedontheWeb at http://econ.worldbank.org. The author may be contacted atbhoekman@worldbank.org.
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Since the entry into force of the agreement establishing the World Trade Organization
(WTO), it has become clear that many governments  and civil society groups in
developing countries have been disappointed with the outcome of the Uruguay Round,
both in terms of market access payoffs and the implementation of certain WTO
agreements.  There  is also a widespread perception that efforts to negotiate additional
disciplines on domestic regulatory policies in the WTO may divert attention away from
more critical development-related  priorities. '
In the run-up to the 1999 WTO ministerial  meeting in Seattle,  a number of
prominent observers  and policymakers called for the launch of a 'Development Round'
of negotiations under WTO auspices to address developing country concerns.  Similar
calls are presently being made in the run-up to the 2001  ministerial meeting in Doha. This
paper discusses how the global trade architecture might be made more supportive of
development.2 Two major arguments are made, both of which can be seen as
preconditions  for greater coherence  in international and national policymaking,
improving the governance  of the trading system, and, ultimately, 'managing
globalization'  (Helleiner,  2000).
First, because trade policy is a critical element of development strategies, the
WTO has a significant role to play in making trade a more effective tool for poverty-
I See Bhagwati  (2000b),  the contributions  in Hoekman and Martin (2001),  the May  2001 issue of The
Review of International  Economics, Wang and Winters  (2000),  the Harvard Global Trade  Negotiations
homepage  http://www.cid.harvard.edu/cidtrade  and www.worldbank.org/trade  for in-depth analyses  of
many of the issues.
2 This issue  is also addressed by World Bank (2001c),  Bhagwati  (2000a) in numerous  essays,  Oyejide
(2000)  and Rodrik (2001b).reducing growth.  WTO members can do this through pursuit of a 'traditional'  market
access agenda that focuses on all products-goods and services-without exception, that
is, includes agriculture and labor-intensive  manufactures such as apparel. From a
development point of view, reducing market access barriers, both in OECD and  in
developing countries, should be a priority. In addition, greater attention should focus on
ensuring that multilateral rules support the development of low-income countries-i.e.,
are not inappropriate  given institutional capacities and constraints. Expanding the set of
players involved in domestic trade policy formulation and the preparation of negotiating
positions can help achieve this objective,  in the process  enhancing the 'ownership'  of
eventual agreements.
Second, market access and development  'friendly' WTO rules are of limited value
to low-income countries if not complemented  by actions to enhance their capacity to
trade. Many of the trade-related constraints confronting low-income economies cannot
(should not) be addressed through negotiations. Instead, they are domestic policy issues
that require national action to improve the investment climate, strengthen domestic
regulation, and so forth. Such actions could benefit from a concerted multilateral effort
outside the WTO to mobilize additional financial and technical assistance ('aid for
trade'), channeled through the appropriate existing institutions for development
cooperation.
1.  Market Access  and Multilateral Rule Making
The bread and butter of the GATT/WTO has always been the reciprocal  reduction of
barriers to trade. As is well known, over time, as tariffs and nontariff barriers came down,
2attention increasingly began to center on the negotiation of disciplines for domestic
policies that could affect trade. In the Uruguay Round, agreements were negotiated that
required harmonization of domestic regulatory policies that had only indirect effects on
trade-the Agreement on Trade-related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS)
is the most prominent example. Although the reduction of trade barriers is generally
welfare improving for countries, given differences  in institutional capacity and reform
priorities, this is not necessarily true for efforts to harmonize  domestic regulatory
regimes.3
Greatly improving market access for goods and services produced in developing
countries and ensuring that multilateral rules support development,  and are seen to be
doing so by civil society, are important elements of enhancing the development relevance
of the WTO. The latter has a number of dimensions: increasing the participation of
developing countries in the process of rule-making and negotiations; devising procedures
to ensure that implementation of agreements promotes development; and dealing with
policies that create international spillovers in an appropriate manner.
Market access
Despite the low average MFN tariff rates that apply in developed countries, tariffs for
some commodities are over 100 percent.  Tariff peaks-rates  above 15 percent-are often
concentrated in products that are of export interest to developing  countries.  In 1999, in
the US alone, imports originating in least developed countries (LDCs) generated tariff
revenue of $487 million, equal to  11.6% of the value of their exports to the US, and
3  See Hoekman and Kostecki (2001)  or Srinivasan (1998)  for more detailed discussion of the WTO and
developing  countries and citations to the literature.
315.7% of dutiable imports (US Department of Commerce,  1999).4 Eliminating such
market access barriers can help boost investment incentives and expand trade-related
employment. Emulation by all OECD countries of recent decisions to grant full duty and
quota free access to LDCs by the EU, Norway and New Zealand would therefore  be
beneficial to these countries-potentially  increasing LDC exports by over 10 percent.5 As
LDCs account for only 0.4% of world trade, offering these countries duty free access will
have only a very limited effect on total imports into OECD nations-suggesting  that
adjustment pressures will be small.
Although  the  LDCs  are  by  definition  among  the  poorest  countries  in the  world,  in
absolute terms  most of the  poor  live  in  developing  countries  that are  not  classified  as
LDCs.  From  a poverty  alleviation  perspective,  it  is therefore  vital  that  market  access
improves for all developing  countries.  Given that non-LDCs are significant traders,  this
will require reciprocity;  liberalization in the OECD is unlikely to be politically feasible if
governments  (interest  groups) cannot  point to 'compensating'  reductions  in developing
country  trade  barriers.6  As average  barriers  in developing  countries  are  higher  than in
industrialized  nations, much  of the potential  welfare gains  from  liberalization  will arise
from reducing  trade  barriers  in developing  countries.7 The  large potential  payoff from
reciprocal  tariff  liberalization  provides  a  strong  rationale  for  engaging  in  traditional
GATT-type tariff negotiations.8
4This  calculation excludes Angola,  95 % of whose exports  are oil-related  and not dutiable.
5  Hoekman,  Ng, and Olarreaga  (2001);  lanchovichina,  Mattoo and Olarreaga  (2000); UNCTAD  (2001).
6  Finger and Winters  (2001) discuss the role of reciprocity  in the WTO.
7  See Hertel  and Martin  (2000) and Bhagwati and Panagariya  (2000).
8  There  is  a preponderance  of evidence that there is a positive relationship  between  openness to trade  and
growth (e.g., World Bank, 2001b,  Srinivasan and Bhagwati,  1999). Although sceptics, e.g., Rodrik (200 lb),
argue  that the strong  association between  exports  and  growth does  not  allow  one  to be sure  about the
direction  of causality, the two are jointly determined by the  strength of countries'  institutions.  Most agree
4The same argument applies to LDCs as well. As noted by Winters (1999),  when it
comes to trade policy, the payoffs to negotiations and liberalization are primarily a
function of domestic action-the extent to which own protection  is reduced.9 Thus, these
countries should also participate in any general lowering of trade barriers negotiated
under WTO auspices.' 0 As negotiations invariably take time and agreements  are only
implemented gradually, the immediate extension of duty-free access to all OECD markets
advocated  above can be seen as front-loading of liberalization by major trading partners.
Given that LDCs have no market power in negotiating down foreign trade barriers-
where tariff peaks can be over 100 percent-unilateral  action is required: they cannot rely
on reciprocity to achieve duty-free access.
Two sectors that matter greatly from a developing  country export perspective  are
textiles and clothing and agriculture.  Although the WTO Agreement on Textiles and
Clothing requires the abolition of textile quotas by 2005, tariff barriers to trade in this
sector remain high. High tariffs for agricultural commodities and continued high levels of
subsidization of agriculture in many OECD countries have  a major detrimental effect on
agricultural exporters such as Argentina and Brazil.  In addition to labor-intensive
manufacturing  and agriculture,  liberalization of trade and investment in services is a
major element of the market access agenda.  Back of the envelope calculations by Winters
(2001) suggest that the income gains that could accrue to developing country nationals
from allowing an increase in temporary access by service suppliers equivalent to 5
that  the  resulting  policy  prescription  is  a  comprehensive  approach  to  development  that  includes
improvement of a range  of institutions,  including  safety nets,  along with trade  liberalization  (World  Bank,
2001 a).
9A useful  mnemonic used by Winters in  this connection  is WYDIWYG:  what you do is  what you get.
10  Although fiscal constraints  may imply  that low-income countries  need to maintain tariffs  above  the
average  prevailing in more advanced  economies  for revenue  collection purposes.
5percent of the OECD population are in the $300 billion range. Liberalization of services
is more complex than negotiating down tariff barriers to trade in goods, as it involves
movement of people, foreign direct investment (FDI) and regulatory reform. A careful
evaluation of services trade policy requires analysis of the conditions of competition in a
particular sector and the need for regulation to achieve efficiency  and equity (Mattoo,
2001). This has implications for both development assistance (the 'complementary
agenda')  and proposals to adopt multilateral rules in the investment and competition areas
(see below).
Market access has two additional important dimensions: disciplining the use of
contingent protection and reducing the extent of discrimination that is created by regional
integration agreements (RIAs). A major benefit of a general, MFN-based reduction in
trade barriers is to reduce the downside of RIAs for nonmembers from RIAs (World
Bank, 2000). The threat of safeguards and related policies (especially  antidumping)
reduces the value of trade liberalization to exporters. Antidumping has now become a
frequently used instrument in both industrialized and developing  countries (Finger et al.,
2000).
Rule Making, Development Priorities  and Policy Coherence
Multilateral negotiations on non-border policies, administrative procedures and domestic
legal regimes have proven to be much more complex than traditional market access talks.
As it is much more difficult to trade 'concessions',  the focus tends to be on identification
of specific rules that should be adopted (Hoekman and Kostecki,  2001). Given disparities
in economic power and resources, the outcome often reflects the status quo in high-
6income countries.  These maybe fully consistent with development priorities of low
income countries,  but there is no presumption this will be the case.
Developing  country concerns regarding  the rule-making  dimensions  of the WTO
became increasingly  prominent  in the  1990s  (Oyejide,  2000).  Concerns  centered  on the
costs required  to implement  some WTO  agreements;  the  absence  of adequate  financial
assistance  and  the  failure  of high-income  countries  to  grant  'special  and  differential'
treatment to  developing  countries; I  and, more  fundamentally,  that the rules of the  game
were  not  always  compatible  with  national  efforts  to  reduce  poverty  and  increase
economic growth.
The costs associated with complying with certain WTO disciplines-e.g., on
customs valuation-can  be significant, not so much because of the rules themselves,12 but
because of the ancillary investments that are required.  The norms that are imposed in
WTO agreements are often those prevailing in OECD countries, implying that
implementation costs may not only be significant for poor countries,  but are
asymmetrically  distributed.  This does not necessarily imply that WTO rules  are bad from
a development perspective,13 but making them work in low-income  countries may require
wholesale reform and strengthening of the affected institutions. From a development
perspective,  the resources required might be better used for alternative purposes (Finger
and Schuler, 2000).
One option that is sometimes proposed to deal with potential implementation
"  Most  provisions  in  WTO  agreements  calling  for  'special  and  differential'  treatment  of developing
countries are so-called 'best endeavor'  commitments-they  are not binding on high-income countries.
12 TRIPs is an exception,  given the rent transfers  that are  likely to be involved.  See  World Bank  (2001c).
13  Exceptions  are the antidumping agreement,  which most economists agree  makes no economic  sense,
and TRIPs-where  there is lessonsensus, but many argue  that the costs may outweigh any gains for low-
7problems is move towards a formalization of a two-track multilateral trading system-
where not all disciplines apply to all members. This is not in the interest of poor countries
given power asymmetries. Past experience has demonstrated that the payoff to seeking to
opt out through a strategy of 'special and differential treatment'-the traditional approach
of developing countries-was  low. However, it was also the case that the opt-out strategy
prevented countries from being subjected to rules that involved significant
implementation costs. What is needed is that the rules that emerge from negotiations
represent and advance the interests of people in developing countries.
As Chadha et al. (2000), Finger (2001)  and Rodrik (2001 a) argue,  for some of the
issue areas that are negotiated in the WTO, a 'one size fits all' approach to regulatory
policies may not be appropriate because it is excessively costly for developing countries.
For the rules to make sense for all members, stakeholders in developing countries must
participate in the domestic policy formation process, be able to inform national
representatives of their views and hold them accountable for outcomes. If WTO
agreements were unambiguously seen to be conducive to (consistent with) attainment of
development objectives  by constituencies in developing countries, implementation would
be much less of an issue.
Even if agreements make sense from a development perspective,  not all countries
will be able to implement them at the same speed. Many will need assistance.
Determining the investments needed in low-income countries would help identify likely
implementation constraints. Recognition of such constraints could include acceptance  of
flexibility in terms of timeframe and modalities of implementation by low-income
countries.
income countries.  See Maskus (2000)  for a survey of the literature  on TRIPs  and further discussion.
8Towards Greater Ownership: Participation  and Transparency
The Uruguay Round marked a change in the attitudes of many developing countries
regarding participation in negotiations. From being largely uninvolved and reactive,
many became active participants  in the negotiating process (Tussie and Lengyel, 2001).
However, this did not prevent these countries from being confronted with bad outcomes.
Participation is not enough; to be effective  it requires a clear understanding of national
objectives and priorities, and how multilateral  agreements and international  cooperation
can help achieve  them.
At the time of the Uruguay Round, there was only limited developing  country
experience  in "new areas" such as intellectual  property protection and service sector
regulation on which the negotiators could draw. Many poor countries have yet to create
intellectual property regimes that makes traditional knowledge  or cultural  products into a
negotiable and defensible asset, or to identify alternative  options to upgrade and enforce
national product,  health and safety standards. In many of these regulatory areas, the trial
and error experience-the  assessments of the real-world  impacts of alternative policy
options-that can inform the design of multilateral rules that support development does
not exist (Finger, 2001).
This lack of experience also makes it difficult to establish lines of communication
between policymakers (negotiators) and key domestic constituents that have interests that
can be pursued through multilateral talks-be it domestic reforms or policy changes in
partner countries to enhance market access.  In the case of industrialized countries,
delegations  and policymakers are informed and lobbied by domestic regulators and
9private sector interests, both commercial  and NGOs. Most developing  countries have
much weaker linkages with stakeholders, impeding their ability to build the political
support needed for welfare-improving  reforns.
For civil society to 'own' the WTO, members must perceive that multilateral
agreements help attain national objectives (and do not work against the attainment of
such objectives).  Getting it right in a technocratic sense is not sufficient; there must be
strong local support for what is (being) negotiated.  As interests will differ and may
conflict, mechanisms to allow distributional conflicts to be resolved in a transparent
fashion are important.  This is not straightforward to achieve, given that trade policy is
inherently a nontransparent redistributive policy instrument, and is often used for that
reason.
Enhancing the transparency of WTO operations and improving access to-and
dissemination of-WTO databases, reports and information (for example,  data
underlying national trade policy reviews) would help civil society (think tanks, NGOs)
engage in the policy formation process (Francois, 2001). Much progress has been made
in comparison with the GATT in terms of access to documentation, but more can and
should be done to ensure that the agenda and outcomes of WTO meetings are made
public. Of particular importance is that the results of negotiations are made publicly
available in user-friendly  form. For example, data on tariff bindings  are currently not
publicly available in a usable database format, preventing analysts from undertaking
cross-country research. This is important because it impedes efforts to estimate the
magnitude and incidence of costs of protection. It is a truism that to reduce protection and
resist protectionist pressures those that lose (pay) need to be aware of the costs of such
10policies. The suppliers of, and the clients for, such analysis and information extend
beyond governments to include think tanks, research institutes and the constituencies  in
individual countries who are affected by policy. To do this, they need easy access to the
relevant data.
Another determinant of ownership of agreements  is the ability of countries to
participate in the WTO process. Many developing countries have inadequate  (or no)
representation in Geneva,  impeding active engagement in negotiations.  Although options
have been identified to expand representation  in Geneva at relatively low cost-for
example,  Blackhurst, Lyakurwa  and Oyejide (2000) propose transferring national
representatives  from UN bodies to Geneva and more intense cooperation by members of
regional integration arrangements-there  is limited expertise available in most countries.
A case can be made that funding should be made available to allow low-income  countries
to finance the cost of hiring experts to assist governments to undertake the required
analyses (Winters, 2001).  Such advice and expertise needs to be available on a long-term
basis to policymakers on a country-by-country  basis. Given that there are dozens of
countries requiring  assistance (the LDC group alone already numbers 49), the annual cost
of such an assistance program will not be insignificant. However, synergies could be
realized through networking and collaboration between advisors.  For example, the new
Global Development Gateway that is being established by the World Bank in cooperation
with numerous public and private sector partners could provide a potentially powerful
vehicle for building a trade community and sharing expertise and experiences.The Regulatory Agenda and  Issue Linkage
An implication of the foregoing is that multilateral cooperation  on regulatory policies that
involves efforts to harmonize should be scrutinized carefully.  In cases where it is unclear
that all members will gain, cooperation  is better pursued outside the WTO-thus
removing the potential threat of binding dispute settlement and possible trade sanctions,
and allowing national experience to be built up in the areas concerned.  This is not to deny
there are potential gains from international  cooperation on regulatory policies-witness
the many organizations and bodies that seek to determine good practices  and establish
international norms and focal points. Examples are international product standards set by
the International  Organization for Standardization, phytosanitary norms established by
the Codex Alimentarius Commission, financial  standards created under auspices of the
Bank for International  Settlements and good practices  in customs clearance  defined by
the World Customs Organization. However, the norms concerned are not arrived at
through a process of quid pro quo negotiation where market access  is made conditional
on the adoption of specific norm.  Instead, implementation  is driven by the self-interest  of
countries, with assistance from relevant international institutions as well as bilateral
donors, and is not subject to binding dispute settlement. The latter is of course a major
reason why these issues are proposed for inclusion in the WTO. However,  there is a great
danger in overloading the institution and reducing its legitimacy and support by using  it
as an enforcement agency for norms developed by technical and specialized bodies.
A corollary of the above argument is that greater care is required in the use of
cross-issue linkages in WTO negotiations.  The classic argument in favor of expanding
the trade negotiating agenda to include regulatory issues is that this allows for more
12tradeoffs  and increases the potential gains from trade (see Hoekman and Kostecki, 2001
for a guide to the literature).  A necessary condition for such issue linkage to be beneficial
for all concerned is that the implications of alternative  deals can be costed out. In practice
this is hard to do for developing countries,  especially when it comes to 'new' issues
where there is little national experience.  This is a major reason why developing country
negotiators have often been risk averse  in GATT/WTO  negotiations.  Issue linkage and
'grand bargains'  can easily result in agreements that have little ownership.' 4 Agreements
that imply the need for significant investment of scarce resources may not be worth
concluding, even if there is a quid pro quo (e.g., greater market access or the removal of
the threat of unilateral sanctions). This is not to say linkages involving regulatory policies
cannot be beneficial or that attempts to harmonize trade-related policies in the WTO is
inappropriate. However,  care must be taken if part of the deal involves resource-intensive
regulatory commitments and institutional reforms.
Two controversial  policy areas to which the foregoing applies are environmental  and
social regulation.  Both are important from a development perspective.  However, what is
required first and foremost in these areas is assistance for developing countries to create
the property and social rights that will allow local stakeholders to defend their interests
and resources to be allocated in a more efficient manner.  These are development issues.
Embedding substantive disciplines in the WTO to allow trade sanctions to be used as an
enforcement device is badly conceived  as it can easily worsen outcomes (e.g., by forcing
workers in targeted countries into informal or illegal activities).  Account should also be
taken of the obvious danger that protectionist interests will capture the process.
14  See,  e.g.,  the statement  by  99 third world  NGO representatives  and intellectuals  against linkage
between  social and environmental  issues  and market access in the WTO  (TWIN-SAL,  2001).
13Positive incentives are needed-carrots,  not sticks. Direct support and assistance of the
type provided by specialized bodies with the requisite expertise such as the ILO and
multilateral  development  agencies can most efficiently and directly improve outcomes.
For example, efforts could be made to improve the quality of, and access to, primary
education for poor children in order to reduce child labor exploitation, e.g.,  via programs
to subsidize the purchase of school supplies, provide transportation,  and reduce the costs
of schooling (Maskus,  1997). Programs along these lines are supported by the ILO and
development institutions in numerous countries.
In the case of environmental policies-which clearly can give rise to serious global
commons issues-the primary need is to clarify the relationship between WTO rules and
multilateral environmental  agreements (Rollo and Winters,  2000). Actions  are also
needed to ensure that unilateral actions by countries that are motivated by environmental
objectives are consistent with the WTO. These are issues that have given rise to a number
of disputes in recent years. Defining what is acceptable in terms of standards-setting  and
national enforcement  is an important question that should be clarified. However, setting
and enforcing  standards in this area is not be a task for the WTO. 5
Two other regulatory policy areas that have been proposed for negotiation in the
WTO are investment and competition policy. These differ from labor or environment in
that they are much more trade-related  and cover policies that have a direct negative effect
on low-income economies.  Examples include tolerating anti-competitive behavior by
national firms on export markets (e.g., shipping conferences that raise transport costs for
15  There is  a large literature  that provides strong support  for these conclusions-see,  e.g.,  Aderson and
Blackhurst (1992)  and Bhagwati and Srinivasan  (1996).
14developing country exporters)16  and OECD investment incentives that aim to prevent
firms from relocating to developing countries.
FDI and competition policies are important for development and growth. At the
same time, it is critical that the lessons of the Uruguay Round are borne in mind.
Enforcement of competition law is an extremely complex  issue, as is the appropriate
design of the specific rules. These are national challenges,  where national learning  and
experimentation should be encouraged.  This is less the case for FDI policies, where the
issues are better understood, and many countries have concluded bilateral investment
treaties.  In both areas, recent proposals that have been put forward by major proponents
are sensitive to development  concerns. Importantly, there is no call for substantive
harmonization of competition legislation or criteria beyond a ban on hard core cartels,
and a recognition that assistance must be provided to developing countries in this area.17
However, if major issues from a developing country perspective are kept off the table-
e.g., OECD investment incentives,  outlawing export cartels, disciplining antidumping-
this will greatly reduce the potential gains from negotiating on these subjects.
Implementation ofAgreements
Even if proposed agreements have strong support in developing countries (i.e., have clear
supporters and stakeholders),  implementation may have significant resource implications.
Doing more to assess the impacts of agreements  ex ante, including a costing out of
investment requirements,  would help avoid difficulties  ex post. The most straightforward
approach to implementation problems would be to rely on 'revealed preference':  if
16 See Fink, Mattoo  and Neagu (2001), Francois and Wooton (2001)  and World Bank (2001c).
15countries do not implement, this is a prima facie signal that the agreement in question is
not deemed to be a development priority. This approach has major drawbacks, however,
as there is not necessarily  a link between development priorities and non-implementation.
Groups that derive rents from policies that impede poverty-alleviating  growth may be
able to block beneficial reforms. Making agreements  nonbinding would also create
incentives  for strategic behavior and greatly impede the negotiation of agreements  in the
first place. 1 8 A major function of the WTO is to help countries overcome political
economy constraints that prevent the adoption of welfare-improving  policies. The
challenge then is to allow for development concerns to be taken into account in instances
where circumstances are such that resource constraints prevent effective implementation
of WTO agreements that were deemed at the time of negotiation to be beneficial. 19
One option could be to adopt an arbitration procedure for implementation disputes that
involve low-income countries.  Such arbitration could be based on a two-stage
'implementation assessment'  on a country-by-country  basis,  at the request of
governments who desire more time to meet WTO norms (once applicable transition
periods have expired). This could involve a determination of what is required to
implement the agreement(s)  in a way that makes sense from an economic perspective
(including a costing out of necessary ancillary reforms and investments), the time frame
" See http://europa.eu.int/comm/trade.
18  The same is true for arguments that the WTO  should become more permissive of national  approaches
and exceptions to negotiated rules as has been suggested  by Rodrik (2000).  Such 'hollowing out'  of the
rules of the game can ultimately make them meaningless.
19  It should be emphasized  that the focus here is on agreements that require real resource  investments and
institutional  strengthening,  not on agreements that can  be implemented by decree or involve  the abolition
of a specific policy-e.g.,  changes  in tariffs,  abolition of MFA  quotas,  or reductins  in subsidies.  The
approach discussed here will not address developing country concerns  that some  of the Uruguay Round
agreements  are detrimental to their interests.  This is something that would have  to be addressed directly
in the context of a new round of negotiations.
i6that would be required given sequencing considerations  and institutional capacity,  and an
assessment of the adequacy of the financial assistance that has been offered by donors.20
The assessment would need to be transparent  and objective. It could be undertaken by
panels of development and trade experts, reporting to the WTO Committee on Trade and
Development.  Active  involvement of national economic policymakers-as  opposed to
Geneva-based trade officials-would be critical to ensure consistency with economic
development priorities  and strategies.
A mechanism of this kind could help foster greater policy 'coherence'  by providing a
vehicle to discuss how WTO disciplines requiring substantial investments of scarce
resources  can be implemented consistently with a country's development strategy.  It
would also generate information on the constraints that prevail, and the adequacy of
development and other assistance that has been provided or offered.  By providing a
forum for the development and trade communities to interact on implementation issues, it
could help both developing and donor countries improve internal policy coherence.
To date, the approach that has been pursued in the WTO with respect to
implementation problems has been primarily agreement-specific.  This has involved
requests for extension of transition periods in relevant WTO Committees and the
20  Such assessments could be informed by national development frameworks  such as the Poverty Reduction
Strategy Paper (PRSP) in the case of low-income  economies, as these establish development priorities on a
country-by-country  basis (see  www.worldbank.org  for a description of the PRSP process).  In  the case of
LDCs, diagnostic reports prepared under auspices of the Integrated Framework (IF) for trade related
technical assistance could also be part of the implementation  assessment process.  The IF is a joint venture
of six international  agencies  (IMF,  ITC,  UNCTAD,  UNDP,  World Bank and WTO), donors  and LDCs.
The  IF supports efforts  to ensure that trade policy,  trade-related  technical assistance,  and capacity-
building  needs are  articulated in a broader development  context.  Donors  have created a trust fund
dedicated  to helping LDCs 'mainstream'  trade  into national  development  strategies.
21 A 'lighter'  approach in administrative terms to this issue could involve the appointment of an
ombudsman or arbitrator who would be given the mandate to undertake the assessment.  Such a
person would need to be a development expert, not a trade official, so as to ensure that
implementation is considered in a broader context.
17Council, complemented by efforts to develop  technical assistance  (TA) work programs
and to obtain information from the major suppliers of TA on their activities in a particular
area. While this is useful in generating information on issue-specific needs in developing
countries,  it does not allow identification of the relative importance of these needs  in the
context of the overall development  strategy of the countries concerned.  Indeed, the issue
is not raised. Even if considered a priority, it does nothing to place trade issues in the
context of the country assistance strategies of multilateral development banks and
bilateral donor assistance agencies. A major lesson from the failure of the Integrated
Framework to mobilize financial support for trade capacity building between 1997-2000
was that trade needs assessments were undertaken in isolation of national development
strategies. Consequently, they did not attract financing by donors and were not 'owned'
by domestic economic policy-making teams (Rajapatirana et al., 2000). A country-
specific approach  can allow issues to be considered in a broader development  context.
Enforcement of agreements
Issues relating to the cost of implementing a subset of WTO agreements  and concerns
about their contribution to development  are one dimension of the 'implementation'
agenda.  Another dimension is implementation of market access commitments by trading
partners.  Low-income countries may have difficulty enforcing their rights through the
WTO dispute settlement system.22 Political realities-asymmetric  distribution of power;
threats of cross-issue linkages and retaliation-may constrain the ability (willingness) of
governments to assist national firms defend their rights in the WTO. Poor countries may
22  What follows draws  on Hoekman and Mavroidis  (2000).
18also find it more difficult to determine when trading partners use WTO-illegal policies to
constrain imports. These factors suggest that dispute settlement should be more of a
collective (multilateral)  endeavor.
One option that could be considered to reduce the need for individual countries to
take actions would be the establishment of an independent 'Special Prosecutor'.  This
office could be granted the mandate to identify and contest potential WTO violations on
behalf of developing countries, using information drawn from private  sources, the Trade
Policy Review Mechanism  (Francois,  2001), the press, etc.  Such outsourcing of
enforcement could help leverage  the activities of the newly created Advisory Centre for
WTO Law (see www.wto.org)  by addressing both the resource constraints  and the
incentive problems (fear of cross-issue linkage) that may impede developing country
governments from pursuing cases. Although cases  brought by the special prosecutor
could not be backed by the threat of retaliation (as they are not brought by or on behalf of
a government), findings against a WTO member would lead to moral pressure to bring
measures into conformity.  Historically, this has been an important factor in inducing
WTO members to abide by the rules of the game.
2.  Complementary Actions  to Harness Trade for Development
A variety of parallel actions to assist developing countries could usefully complement
efforts in the WTO to make agreements more relevant from a development perspective.  A
key need is to strengthen the ability to identify and defend national  interests and trade
policy priorities (a precondition both for participating effectively  in the WTO as well as
international  bodies that that set norms in areas such as product standards).  Another is to
19upgrade trade-related infrastructure  and institutions and expand trade capacity. These  are
areas where actions must be taken by developing countries, but where greater
international assistance, delivered through existing development-related  institutions,
could do much to help countries benefit more from improved market access.23 What
follows discusses a number of possible action areas.
Support to develop national  trade  constituencies and  strategies
As noted previously, a precondition for domestic ownership of agreements is that there
are constituencies that have an incentive to see specific reforms implemented.  Support for
country-specific studies that aim at identifying reform priorities and infrastructure  needs
(both soft and hardware)  is an important dimension of this, as is identification of policy
options and their distributional and growth impacts, and, critically, mobilization of
finance to address the priority bottlenecks to trade and employment expansion.  This is
now a major focus of the Integrated  Framework (IF) effort for LDCs. The issues and
needs in low-income countries that are not LDCs are very similar. The assistance
provided by the IF is premised on a PRSP or similar strategy document. Many of the low-
income countries that are not regarded as LDCs are also preparing PRSPs, and these
could also become the focal point for trade-related assistance. In cases where an
analogous national strategy document does not exist, care will need to be taken to ensure
that trade issues are placed in the context of overall development priorities (Raj apatirana
et al, 2000).24
23  While improvements  in  the institutional and infrastructure  areas discussed  below will increase  the
benefits of trade reforms (market  access liberalization),  the latter should not be made conditional upon
the former.
24  As pointed by Rajapatirana in  private correspondence,  because trade policy is  inherently redistributive,
20Upgrading  Institutional  Capacity and Trade-related  Infrastructure
A number of trade-related  challenges confront all developing  countries, including
middle-income economies. Examples include meeting product standards, protecting
intellectual property, regulating service industries; improving trade logistics and customs
clearance,  and, more generally, upgrading transport, communications  and other key
infrastructure  services. All of these policy areas are important dimensions of the overall
investment climate. Which (if any) are priorities will depend on individual countries,  as a
basic question for governments in these areas is whether incurring the investment costs
makes sense from an overall development  and poverty-reduction perspective.  In cases
where the answer is affirmative,  low-income developing  countries may need both
technical and financial assistance to address specific needs. Global issue-specific
initiatives to create mechanisms  for multilateral cooperation  in the delivery of technical
assistance,  expertise and resources in the areas concerned would be an important
complement to WTO-centered  activities.
As noted previously, in many regulatory areas there are potential gains from
international cooperation,  and institutions have been created for that purpose. In a number
of instances WTO agreements and disciplines refer to norms that have been established
under auspices of such bodies-examples are the World Intellectual Property
Organization, the International  Organization for Standardization,  and the World Customs
Organization.  Global initiatives could also focus on ensuring that international norms
with losers from liberalization  generally concentrated and gainers  spread throughout the economy, there is
a danger that a participatory process such as the PRSP will result in trade reform being neglected.  Active
support to assist countries  in identifying the impact of status quo policies of the type offered by the IF may
therefore have a high payoff.
21make sense from a development perspective. This requires that more attention is given to
the processes through which standards are set.
Bridging the Global Product  Standards  Divide
As poor consumers in low-income  countries have limited access to information  and do
not have the resources to buy higher quality goods and services, they are dependent on
efficient standardization  and consumer protection  regimes. Many low-income countries
are not adequately equipped to adopt and enforce product standard requirements.  Testing,
and certification requirements  can also be a serious obstacle for developing countries
seeking to expand exports.  Recent examples include Ugandan  fish and South Asian
shrimp, as well as proposed EU standards for aflatoxin that could reduce export revenue
for African countries by more than $600 million (Otsuki, Wilson and Sewadeh,  2001).
Developing countries face a series of challenges:  they need to reform and upgrade
standards setting regimes, establish efficient testing, certification,  and laboratory
accreditation mechanisms to conform with sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) norms and
technical product standards, and defend their interests in intemational standards-setting
bodies that design global norms (Henson, Preibisch and Masakure,  2001). The latter has
become more important following the presumption of the WTO SPS agreement that
members should apply existing international  standards. Modernization of infrastructure
and capacity building to meet global regulatory requirements and standards can have
large payoffs in terms of expanding trade opportunities.  The same is true of reducing
transactions costs associated with redundant testing and certification requirements, or
efforts to ensure that international  standards set by specialized bodies are appropriate for
22developing countries.  But, such actions also can be quite expensive.  An initiative to bring
together major development institutions,  specialized standards setting bodies and bilateral
donors to assist developing  countries address such issues would help improve
competitiveness  and expand trade opportunities (Wilson, 2001).
Intellectual  Property  Rights and Development
Much attention has recently centered on the TRIPs agreement and its implications for
development.  Whatever its faults, the TRIPs agreement provides a great deal of latitude
in terms of how countries implement it (Watal, 2001). However, the agreement is of little
help to developing  countries seeking guidance  on how to minimize costs and maximize
the benefits of intellectual property rights (IPRs) (Finger and Nogues, 2001).  Low-
income countries need to identify intellectual property that should be protected, thereby
creating commercial  assets whose value can be defended  and augmented through the
negotiation of international rules. Designing an intellectual property regime that is
relevant for the situation and characteristics  of a developing  country is not
straightforward.  Simply copying the regime that is in place in an OECD country will not
do.  The type of intellectual property that needs to be protected varies across countries,  as
does institutional capacity.  Funding is needed for country-level efforts to identify
stakeholders and the assets that could benefit from protection.
This is an issue that extends far beyond pharmaceuticals  and patent protection.
While this is important,  as patents can significantly increase the costs of medicines,  IPRs
can also benefit sectors in which traditional knowledge is a factor of production: music,
crafts and design, community-based  tourism, ethno-botanicals  (Penna and Visser, 2001).
23All have potential to generate  substantial foreign exchange revenues and benefit the poor.
Those developing  countries with potentially valuable resources that could be protected-
e.g., traditional knowledge and genetic resources-therefore  may have a strong interest in
developing IPR systems.
A variety of policies can also be pursued to reduce the magnitude of the income
transfer  from South to North that will be associated with implementation of TRIPs.
Examples include facilitating the absorption and diffusion of know-how, vigorous
enforcement of competition law, and direct regulation (Correa, 2000; Maskus, 2000). The
TRIPs agreement allows significant latitude for governments to draft implementing
legislation that attenuates the ability of right-holders to abuse their market power. The
issue is to identify cost-effective  ways to do so.
Service Sector Liberalization  and  Regulatory Reform
Buyers of services are often inadequately informed about the attributes of sellers, e.g., the
competence  of doctors and lawyers, the safety of transport services or the soundness of
banks and insurance companies.  Regulation can help offset such market failures, but may
also impede trade.  For example,  in the case of professional services, low standards and
disparities in domestic training and examinations can become  a major impediment to
obtaining foreign recognition. Thus, weak domestic regulation can legitimize external
barriers to trade. More important for many developing countries is that inadequate
domestic regulation may give rise to serious internal distortions. For example,  the
absence of pro-competitive  regulatory policies may substantially reduce the social payoff
to privatization if it results in rent transfers to the new private owners of the firms.
24The need for effective regulation of financial services was highlighted by the recent
financial crises in emerging markets-it is clearly a necessary condition for benefiting
fully from liberalization.
For service sector liberalization to contribute to development, it needs to be
supported by regulation  and competition policy disciplines. Such institutions involve
substantial startup and running costs, as well as sophisticated skills. For example,  the
total cost of government in Dominica in the late 1  990s was $41 million a year, while a
bare-bones regulatory authority is likely to cost $2 million each year, or 5%  per cent of
the budget (Mattoo,  2001). To some extent such costs can be recovered through fees or
reduced via regional cooperation-but external assistance can help ensure that adequate
regulation is in place.
To ensure that liberalization improves access of the poor to essential services,
regulatory intervention may also be needed.  For instance, competitive provision of
subsidized public access helped increase household ownership  of a telephone in Chile
from  16 percent in 1988 to 74 percent in 2000 (Mattoo,  2001). Providing international
assistance in meeting the costs of the required subsidy programs could greatly facilitate
liberalization by ensuring that the needs of the poor would be met.
Trade Facilitation
Trade facilitation comprises the simplification and harmonization of international
procedures affecting trade flows. Customs-related transaction costs-not including the
opportunity costs of delays-can represent up to  10 percent of a shipment's value in
some countries (Staples, 2001). Costs are compounded if there is corruption and delay.
25More efficient procedures, electronic data exchange and minimizing redundancy can
provide important benefits.  Good practices in this area have been identified  and agreed
multilaterally under auspices of the World Customs Organization (WCO)-see Messerlin
and Zarrouk (2000). However, many developing  countries will be hard pressed to attain
these standards,  given weak institutions, lack of modem communications  and information
systems, inadequately trained staff, etc.
Developing countries are still struggling to implement the WTO customs valuation
agreement, and they have doubts about the value of accepting additional mandatory
obligations on trade facilitation given weak institutional structures, lack of modem
communications and information systems, inadequately trained staff, and so forth. Even
Canada, a developed country with ample resources, took five years to complete
implementation of the valuation agreement (Staples, 2001). Poor countries can attain only
gradually the good practices that are enumerated in the WCO and other conventions.
Significant technical and financial  assistance is needed for training and institutional
strengthening, including in ancillary areas such as tax administration.
3.  Conclusion
Three types of actions could help make the global trade architecture  more supportive of
development:  (i) greatly improving market access for goods and services produced by
workers in developing  countries, (ii) ensuring that the WTO rules of the game  support
development, and (iii) international initiatives to help countries address national trade
capacity constraints and improve environmental  and social policies. The first two of these
action areas center on the WTO.  They do not imply making the WTO a development
26institution. As argued by Finger (2001), attempts to move in this direction would be
counter-productive.  Instead, what is needed is action by developing  countries (and the
development community more broadly defined)  to use the WTO to address those trade
policies where multilateral disciplines  would have the highest development payoff:
market access.
A plethora of research suggests that expanding market access for manufactures,
agriculture and services would generate large income  gains in developing countries.
While elimination of barriers in OECD countries is important in this regard, such gains
will be maximized if remaining barriers in developing countries  are also reduced
significantly and are bound in the WTO. Broad-based reciprocal liberalization of barriers
to trade in goods and services  is the most important development-relevant  dimension of
the WTO. Given the urgent needs of the poorest countries, a good case can be made on
equity grounds for OECD countries to grant immediate duty-free access to their markets
for the poorest  countries. This would permit them to compete  on the same basis as the
'most-favored'  developing nations in OECD markets-those benefiting  from free trade
agreements.
Market access issues extend beyond tariffs. They include contingent protection
(antidumping,  safeguards), rules of origin, subsidies to agriculture,  FDI incentives in
OECD nations, and policies that restrict temporary movement  of service  suppliers
(natural persons).  Space constraints have prevented an in-depth discussion of these
issues-all of which provide opportunities for action to benefit developing  countries.25
25  See  the references  cited in footnote  1 above and Oyejide  (2000).
27Greater efforts to determine the impact of proposed rules of the game on developing
countries and recognition of the need for flexibility in terms of the time frame for
implementation  of resource-intensive  agreements by lower-income nations should help
assuage fears regarding the potential downside of engaging in future negotiations.
Moving away from automatic and binding dispute settlement and towards multilateral
assistance and arbitration in cases where low-income countries experience difficulties  in
implementing resource-intensive  agreements could also help mobilize support.
A precondition for ensuring that WTO rules are relevant to developing countries is
active involvement of stakeholders in these countries in the process of formulating
national positions and effective participation by their representatives  in the WTO
negotiating process. Given human and financial resource constraints,  providing funding
to allow low-income countries to buy expertise to assist in negotiations  and to 'outsource'
enforcement would help level the playing field. However, such assistance will only be
effective if there are complementary  efforts at the country-level to determine how to use
possible trade rules to attain domestic development objectives.  This in turn requires the
existence of national processes to identify and prioritize such objectives,  a determination
by countries how trade fits into overall development strategies and reform priorities, and
identification of key bottlenecks.
Efforts to enhance the development-relevance  of the WTO should be complemented
by parallel initiatives to address key institutional and trade infrastructure constraints  in
developing economies.  The 'complementary  agenda' potentially  spans a large number of
areas. While governments  and stakeholders  should take the lead in identifying priorities
and taking actions to strengthen relevant institutions, greater 'aid for trade' could
28significantly improve the ability of firms and workers in low-income  countries both to
obtain and to benefit from better access to markets.  Options include:
*  Assistance  to low-income countries to integrate trade into national  development
strategies. Such assistance has begun to be provided on a pilot basis to LDCs in
the context of the Integrated Framework and the PRSP process and could
beneficially be extended to include other low-income countries.
*  Assistance to help developing  countries to attain national environmental  and
social objectives. Programs in these areas are being implemented by a variety of
specialized  institutions and development entities.  Expanding funding for work in
these areas would provide positive incentives to improve outcomes, using
instruments that directly target prevailing distortions.
*  Programs that focus on specific trade-related issues that are of common concern
to all developing countries, including middle-income  economies. Examples
include product standardization,  trade facilitation, and the design of intellectual
property protection and service sector regulation.
Ultimately, the development  and growth prospects of countries and the ability to benefit
from expanded trade depend on the quality of infrastructure  and related services (ports,
roads, telecoms),  education, public health, the judicial  system, etc. All of these have  a
major impact on the investment climate and are critical to the empowerment of people in
developing countries. They constitute the major part of the development agenda.  The
needs in these areas must be addressed through multilateral lending and public and
private sector investment. They are not trade issues, and do not figure on the WTO
agenda, but are major determinants of the ability to benefit from trade opportunities.
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